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THE EVOLUTION OF TELCO-CONSTRUCTED
BROADBAND SERVICES FOR CATV
OPERATORS
Thomas A. Hart, Jr. *
Recently franchised cable television operators across the country are look-
ing for ways to expedite delivery of transmission service and reduce the ex-
pense of constructing broadband systems. At the same time, the telephone
industry ("telco") is seeking to diversify its sources of revenue by offering to
construct, lease, and maintain broadband cable distribution systems. The
interests of both industries seem to be furthered by cable/telco joint ventures
to construct broadband cable distribution facilities.
This article discusses the history of telco involvement in the development
of cable television service and examines many of the controversial issues
raised over the past thirty years at the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC). It also reviews recently passed federal legislation
and sections of the American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) Modified Fi-
nal Judgment dealing with telco participation in the cable television indus-
try. Finally, this article analyzes three cable leaseback construction
arrangements proposed by cable television operators and the local telephone
companies. Of these three proposals, analytical emphasis is placed on the
proposal of District Cablevision, Inc. (DCI) and C & P Telephone Company
(C & P) to construct and maintain the cable television broadband distribu-
tion system for the District of Columbia.
The Commission, under title II of the Communications Act,' scrutinizes
the construction and leaseback of cable distribution facilities by telephone
companies. Typically, the facilities for the cable television operator must be
individually designed, constructed, and priced in response to a customer's
request where existing lines of ordinary tariffed facilities would be inade-
quate. Therefore, each joint venture proposal presented by local telcos and
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1. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
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cable operators must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with particular
attention to the potential for anticompetitive behavior.
The local telco and cable system have historically been perceived to be
strange bedfellows. During the early 1950's and 1960's, telcos first became
involved in the construction and maintenance of video cable distribution sys-
tems, which were generally leased back to the cable operator. Some in-
dependent telcos formed subsidiaries for the management and operation of
Community Antenna Television (CATV) systems built by the telco.
The Bell System was barred from providing cable television service by the
1956 Western Electric Consent Decree. Later, in 1970, the FCC prohibited
telephone companies from directly or indirectly providing CATV service
within their telephone service area. Also in the 1970's, telephone involve-
ment in the construction of cable systems was retarded because the Commis-
sion ordered that telephone carriers had to receive approval to construct
cable television systems or provide channel service to cable television sys-
tems. Concurrently, cable operators found, in some instances, that they
could construct their own facilities faster and more efficiently without telco
involvement. In the process of this evolution, heated disputes arose between
cable operators and the telcos over access to telephone poles and under-
ground conduits. Thus, the relationship between local telephone companies
and cable operators has been characterized by periods of cooperation on the
one hand and competition on the other.
The cable and telephone industries have now come full circle; cable televi-
sion operators and telcos are reexamining their relationship from a new and
more aggressive perspective. Telcos are eager to improve their competitive
edge in the transmission of voice, data, and video information. At the same
time, cable operators are more interested in the expedited construction of
their cable systems to reduce the potential penetration of competing new
technologies such as subscription television (STV), multichannel multipoint
distribution systems (MMDS), direct broadcast satellite (DBS) and opera-
tional fixed services (OFS). These economic incentives and public policy
reasons have brought cable television operators and local telephone compa-
nies closer together. In the future, the relationship between the two will
continue to evolve in ways that will increase telco involvement in the con-
struction and maintenance of cable television systems.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TELCO INVOLVEMENT IN CABLE TELEVISION
Most cable television operators in the 1950's found that plant installation
expense and local regulation made construction of a utility pole or under-
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ground conduit broadband network nearly prohibitive.2 In some instances,
to reduce expenses, cables were strung on trees throughout the service area.3
As the industry evolved, however, cable operators turned to utility compa-
nies with their preexisting pole and conduit networks as an alternate means
of distributing cables.4
In most rural communities, the utility poles were jointly owned by local
power and telephone companies. Many small power companies allowed the
larger telephone operating companies to act as sole negotiators for all agree-
ments with cable companies which included attachments to or joint use of
poles.5 In these early days, the telephone companies, which allowed open
access to pole attachments for Western Union and government facilities, al-
lowed many cable television operators to attach their cables for a "pole at-
tachment" fee of one or two dollars per pole per year.6
A. AT&T and Bell Operating Companies Move to Influence
CA TV Development
In the late 1950's, equipment was developed enabling cable systems to
2. Plaintiff's First Statement of Contentions and Proof at 203, United States v. AT&T,
No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as First Statement]; 2 C. FERRIS, F.
LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW-A VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE
GUIDE 16.02[1] n. 1 [hereinafter cited as CABLE TV LAW] (local communities were reluctant
to authorize construction of separate cable television pole or conduit systems for aesthetic
reasons).
3. First Statement, supra note 2, at 203. See NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIA-
TION, WHITE PAPER: CABLE & TELEPHONE COMPANIES: A HISTORY OF CONFRONTATION
3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPER].
The first commercial cable system began in Lansford, Pennsylvania in 1950. These early
three-channel community antenna systems were developed to provide standard broadcast tele-
vision signals to areas with poor receptioni Antennas were erected on mountaintops or other
points of good reception to capture the local television signals and carry them via coaxial cable
to subscribers. See 1 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 5.03.
Cable television developed as a result of a lack of adequate broadcast television service in
rural and medium sized communities. Id. This void in service may have been due, in part, to
the Commission's 1948 freeze on the processing of new television station applications pending
review of its requirements for mileage spacing between stations. 13 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1948).
4. S. REP. No. 580, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977) (Regulation of Cable Television Pole
Attachments). In most communities, the Bell Operating Companies, as well as local power
companies, held franchises that allowed them to construct utility poles and underground con-
duit networks.
5. First Statement, supra note 2, at 212.
6. The greater part of the telephone industry viewed CATV service as a rural phenome-
non and a temporary service that would disappear in the wake of expanding television broad-
cast markets. See id. at 203. This same attitude has been adopted for Subscription Television
(STV) and Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS). Popular opinion holds that these technol-
ogies will only remain profitable in noncabled markets. 2 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at
18.05.
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increase their channel offering to twelve television channels.7 This expanded
capacity gave cable systems the ability to offer more than just retransmission
of the three network television broadcast services.' The telephone industry,
which had considered new broadband services a natural extension of its ex-
isting monopoly over wire communications in the local "loop" 9 area, was
faced with potential competition from an aggressive new cable television in-
dustry that delivered a second communications conduit into the nation's
households. Cable television has the potential of providing communities
with a range of entertainment and communications services that would sur-
pass any the telephone company could offer over its existing local telco
network. 1O
The competitive atmosphere between the telephone company and cable
industries was aggravated when the Bell System was prohibited from enter-
ing the cable television business under the terms of the 1956 Consent Decree,
7. First Statement, supra note 2, at 203-04. The fully transistorized 12-channel cable
amplifier gave cable systems the technical ability and channel capacity to offer nonbroadcast
broadband services. 2 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 16.02[2].
8. With the advent of 12-channel capacity, cable systems began to transmit and market
other one-way services in addition to off-the-air television programming. In the early 1960's,
cable operators began to offer Pay-TV, FM music, closed circuit educational television and
some locally originated television programming. First Statement, supra note 2, at 204. More
importantly, cable operators recognized cable's capacity for transmission of nonentertainment
services. These potential new services include one-way hookups, such as teletext, stock market
reports, and advertising, and two-way interactive offerings including videotext, alarm systems,
meter reading, and electronic banking. These potential new services also include data trans-
missions, teleconferencing, and even regular telephone service. See, e.g., Noam, Towards an
Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34
FED. COM. L.J. 209, 235-36 (1982).
9. The term "local loop" refers to the pair of copper wires that connects each telephone
subscriber to the local phone company's central office or "switch." Anderson & Lazarus, Data
Transmission Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, TELEMATICS, November
1984, at 2.
10. A 12-channel cable system offered subscribers tremendous capacity for transmission
of voice, data, or other information. A single cable channel has a band width of 6 MHz-the
equivalent of 1,500 voice grade lines. Id. Overall, the capacity of a coaxial cable is 45,000
times greater than the capacity of a phone wire. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION:
THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 215 (Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORT]. Telephone companies, however,
do have two advantages over cable systems. A telephone company offers universal access and
switching equipment that can send a signal from one local loop to another without the message
being readily accessible to third persons. A cable system will never achieve 100% penetration
of the nation's households. Since messages cannot be individually switched, all subscriber lo-
cations between the sending and receiving locations must be blocked off. Anderson & Lazarus,
supra note 9, at 2.
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which settled a 1949 antitrust suit against Western Electric. 1 Thereafter,
AT&T and its subsidiaries were restricted to offering only common carrier
communication services.1 2 The retransmission of over-the-air broadcast sig-
nals, the basic service provided by cable systems, has been classified by the
Commission as a noncommon carrier service.13 Thus, the Bell System was
11. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
On January 14, 1949, the government filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey against the Western Electric Company, Inc. and the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., Inc. The complaint alleged that the defendants had monopolized
and conspired to restrain trade in the manufacture, distribution, sale, and installation of tele-
phones, telephone apparatus, equipment, materials, and supplies in violation of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1982). The relief sought included: the divestiture by AT&T of its stock
ownership in Western Electric; termination of exclusive relationships between AT&T and
Western Electric; divestiture by Western Electric of its 50% interest in Bell Telephone Labora-
tories; separation of telephone manufacturing from the provision of telephone service; and the
compulsory licensing of patents owned by AT&T on a nondiscriminatory basis. See United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135-36 (D.D.C. 1982).
On January 24, 1956, the district court accepted a consent decree that precluded AT&T
from engaging in any business other than the provision of common carrier communications
services and enjoined Western Electric from manufacturing equipment other than that used by
the Bell System. The decree also required the defendants to license their patents to all appli-
cants upon the payment of appropriate royalties. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH)
at 71,137-41. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
12. Independent phone companies, such as General Telephone & Electronics (GTE) and
United Telephone, were not prohibited by the consent decree from owning cable systems.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 13.
13. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958). The case arose from a com-
plaint filed by 13 licensees of standard television broadcast stations who requested that the
Commission exercise jurisdiction over cable television systems as communications common
carriers under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. Id. at 251. Section 3(h) of the
Communications Act states:
'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for
hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or for-
eign radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common carri-
ers not subject to this Act; but a person engaged in radio braodcasting shall not,
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
In Frontier Broadcasting, the Commission found that the legislative history of the Commu-
nications Act makes it clear that Congress intended that the common carrier regulatory provi-
sions of title II should not apply to persons who are not common carriers in the ordinary sense
of the term. Id. at 254. The Commission found that the traditionally accepted concept of
common carrier is one that holds itself out to the public to provide facilities by wire or radio to
all members of the public, if they choose to communicate. The content of the communication
or transmission is the sole responsibility or prerogative of the subscriber according to the Com-
mission. Id. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1199-1206 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Although CATV systems possess several attributes of a communications common car-
rier, specifically, an offer to transmit by wire, intelligence, in the form of television broadcast
signals, to any member of the public who desires to subscribe to the service, the Commission
found these similarities insufficient to warrant regulation of cable television under title II. The
dispositive factor in the Frontier Broadcasting decision was that specific television signals re-
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foreclosed from direct competition with the cable industry.
In 1964, to assess the potential threat posed by cable television, AT&T
established an office in its Planning Department to oversee CATV rates and
policies. AT&T management decided that if it did not act quickly, "Ma
Bell" would no longer be a full service communications carrier, but would be
relegated "to an outmoded, voice-only equivalent of Western Union."14
AT&T executives concluded that, in order to meet the challenge presented
by broadband cable television services, the company had to attempt to be-
come involved in the communications facilities needed to transmit them.1
5
To insulate itself from cable's broadband service challenge, AT&T di-
rected its Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) to restrict the types of services
that could be provided over any cables which were attached to their poles. 16
The BOCs began to require and to enforce usage restrictions as part of their
pole attachment agreement.1 7 In particular, many prohibited cable opera-
tors from transmitting Pay TV, Education TV, Closed Circuit TV, FM mu-
sic and any interactive (two-way) services.18
At the same time, AT&T was adopting policies that served to discourage
cable operators from establishing their own facilities.19 Specifically, AT&T
encouraged its operating companies to increase their rates for pole attach-
ments,20 and required that no more than one cable company be allowed to
ceived and distributed by the CATV system are, of necessity, determined by the CATV system
and not the subscriber. Frontier Broadcasting, 24 F.C.C. at 254-55.
14. First Statement, supra note 2, at 205. AT&T executives determined that some data
transmissions and even local exchange service could be lost. Id.
15. Id. at 206. AT&T analysis of cable competititon in the 1967 Visual Mode Task Force
Report estimated that if AT&T did not get involved, the Bell System could lose the entire
broadband market within five years. Id.
16. See 2 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 16.02[3] (CATV systems were restricted to
over-the-air broadcast transmission service); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 12.
17. See 2 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 16.02[3]. A clause in a model pole attach-
ment agreement used by Pacific Northwest Bell in 1966 represents the restrictions used by the
entire Bell System:
[L]icensee agrees that it will use its facilities attached to the Licensor's poles primar-
ily for the transmission of program material received off-the-air from, or furnished
by, standard television or FM broadcasting stations. The Licensee may make inci-
dental use of the facilities to transmit to its patrons general program material ...
distributed by closed circuit interexchange networks as such program material
originated locally. The Licensor shall have the right to terminate this agreement on
thirty days' notice to the Licensee if in the Licensor's judgment the Licensee's trans-
mission of program material from standard broadcasting stations becomes or has
become incidental to other uses or the Licensee announces or has announced plans
which will have that effect.
First Statement, supra note 2, at 208.
18. First Statement, supra note 2, at 207.
19. Id. at 213. See supra note 13.
20. First Statement, supra note 2, at 214. Beginning in 1965, AT&T assumed managerial
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attach cable to its telephone poles.2" These measures were meant to enhance
the marketability of cable distribution systems, referred to as channel ser-
vice.22 These broadband facilities were built by the local BOC and then
leased back to the cable operator. The BOCs' share of new cable television
construction increased from less than 1% in 1964 to 28.4% in 1967.23
Under the terms of some BOC Channel Service Tariffs filed with the
FCC,24 CATV operators were offered broadband facilities capable of simul-
taneous one-way, nonreversible transmission of a maximum of twelve televi-
sion signals.25 The BOCs, however, retained ownership and control over the
channel service facilities, which gave them the ability potentially to control
the nature of cable television service offered.26 The BOCs limited the use of
control over all aspects of channel service offerings by the BOCs. By the end of 1965, pole
attachment rates averaged between three and four dollars, double the original rate. This price
increase represented AT&T's policy of setting prices just below the cost at which cable opera-
tors could establish their own facilities. Id.
21. Id. at 216. The BOCs did not restrict the number of CATV operators who could lease
channel service. This policy appears to be indefensible because the BOCs had to attach their
channel service cables to the same poles upon which the CATV operators had originally re-
quested attachment. Id.
22. See 2 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 16.02[d]. Through this pricing practice,
AT&T was able to establish channel service in 44 states by 1966. First Statement, supra note
2, at 214.
23. First Statement, supra note 2, at 214. As an added incentive to lease channel service,
the BOCs offered independent cable operators access to the community without the burden of
obtaining a municipal franchise. Because many of the BOCs hold a state franchise for use of
the streets and rights of way, many regulators reasoned that a cable operator that leased chan-
nel service from the phone company need not obtain a franchise. Such an arrangement gave
cable operators a competitive advantage over other operators that were required to obtain a
franchise from the city and build their own system. Id. at 215. See 1 CABLE TV LAW, supra
note 2, at 9.15 n.3.
24. In 1959, New York Telephone (NYT) became the first BOC to initiate channel service
to a CATV system. Southern New England Telephone and Southwestern Bell System began
to offer channel service in 1963. By 1964, 18 BOCs had filed tariffs with the state public utility
commissions (PUC) for channel service. WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 6. On April 7, 1966,
the Commission decided that telephone company tariffs covering the furnishing of local distri-
bution facilities for use by CATV systems must be filed with the Commission rather than with
state agencies. Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C.2d 257 (1966). See infra
note 45 and accompanying text.
25. See New York Telephone Co., Tariff FCC No. 34, Channel Servicefor Use in Commu-
nity Antenna Television Systems (November 1966) (adopted by AT&T Communications, Tariff
FCC No. 36 (January 1, 1984)) [hereinafter cited as NY Tariff].
26. NY Tariff, supra note 25, at 7-8. Channel service was furnished on a nonexclusive
basis and the plant and facilities used in furnishing such service were part of the phone compa-
nies' common carrier plant used generally by them in furnishing communications services to
the public. Such facilities provided CATV systems transmission capacity from a specified in-
put point (normally the cable head end-point of reception of over-the-air broadcast signals) to
a specified output point (CATV subscribers' premises). Id. See North Pittsburgh Telephone
Co., Tariff FCC No. 1, Regulations and Schedules of Changes Applying to Television Transmis-
1985]
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channel service to distribution of off-the-air broadcast television and FM ra-
dio programming.1 7 In addition, the cable operator was prohibited from
splitting channels or authorizing use of the service by a third party.28 By the
terms of the BOC Channel Service Tariffs,29 AT&T attempted to limit se-
verely CATV competition in data transport and two-way transmissions
services.30
B. Independent Telcos Develop Protectionist Policies to Retard
CA TV Development
The pole attachment policies of a few independent telephone companies,
namely General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) and United Telephone
(United), were probably more detrimental to CATV development in their
own service areas than in service areas where the local telephone service was
provided by the Bell System. In the period between 1964-1966, GTE and
United directed their telephone subsidiaries to refuse all new pole attach-
ment requests from independent CATV operators.31 Both independents,
free of the ownership restrictions of the 1956 Consent Decree,32 denied pole
access to CATV operators because they believed that CATV was a commu-
nications service that should be offered by the local telephone company.3 3
The independent phone companies felt that they needed to enter the CATV
sion and/or Head End Facilities for Use in Furnishing Community Antenna Service 5 (Sept. 1,
1970).
27. See General Telephone Co., 13 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 667, 669 (1968).
28. NY Tariff, supra note 25, at 8.
29. Id.
30. The growth of cable television systems' two-way services has been slow. Manhattan
Cable first tested the market for data transmission between business users in 1974. Manhattan
Cable successfully marketed high speed computer interconnections and electronic mail services
to several New York City banks and the municipal government. Nonetheless, it was estimated
that only 5.26 million homes would be wired for two-way cable television services by the end of
1984. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORT, supra note 10, at 214-15; infra note 105 and ac-
companying text.
The independent telephone company tariffs for channel service provided for one-way nonre-
versible transmission of standard broadcast television and FM radio program material only.
Customers were prohibited from reselling the facilities and channel splitting was prohibited.
See Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co., Tariff No. 1, Channel Service for Use in Community
Antenna Television Systems 8-9 (June 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Carolina Tariff]. See also
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31. CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 16.02[3]; see WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 14-
16.
32. See supra note 12.
33. WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 14. See Manatee Cablevision, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 841,
846 (1970) (Commission found that General Telephone of Florida (GTF) and GTE Communi-
cations engaged in anticompetitive conduct designed to eliminate a CATV system as a compet-
itor; therefore, these General System Companies were ordered to cease and desist any further
CATV operations.).
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business primarily to "protect the interests of their local operating compa-
nies, in anticipation of future developments in communications which would
require a broadband transmission facility.",34
Both GTE and United developed cable television service subsidiaries to
compete directly with independent cable television operators for local
franchises.35 GTE Communications (GTEC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
GTE, was established in 1965 to offer CATV service directly to residential
or business customers. 36 On several occasions, GTE's local operating com-
panies engaged in conduct that might have given GTEC a competitive ad-
vantage over independent cable applicants. 37  GTE operating companies
would assure the franchising authority that GTEC would experience no de-
lay in the construction of its cable facilities, while at the same time the GTE
operating companies refused pole attachment rights to the competing in-
dependent cable applicants. Not surprisingly, GTEC was almost always the
successful franchisee in communities served by a GTE company.38
United's operating companies were equally aggressive in their attempts to
secure cable franchises for their cable subsidiary, United Transmission, Inc.
(UTI). United practiced tactics similar to GTE's in an attempt to squeeze
independent cable television competitors. Ultimately, the condition became
so troubling that the Commission discontinued UTI's cable television ser-
vice. 39 The Commission based its cease and desist order upon United's re-
fusal to allow an independent CATV company pole attachments and access
to other facilities for the franchise and construction of a competing cable
television system.4 The Commission found that UTI took advantage of
34. WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 14. See Warrensburg Cable, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 910,
919 (1973) (Commission found that United Telephone of Missouri (UM) attempted to block
entry of an independent CATV operator into the Warrensburg, Missouri market, while at the
same time constructing a competing system for a United Telephone subsidiary, United Trans-
mission, Inc. (UTI). Id. The Commission also found that UM's sale of the UTI system to a
third party without the Commission's approval was void. Id. This anticompetitive conduct,
the Commission found, warranted an order against the former UTI system to cease and desist
any further CATV operations. Id.
35. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 16; see also TeleCable Corp., 19 F.C.C.2d 574
(1969) (The Commission found General Telephone Co. of Illinois conferred upon its subsidi-
ary GTEC an unfair advantage over competing applicants for cable franchises in Bloomington
and Normal, Illinois.).
36. Id. at 578.
37. Id. at 588. See Manatee Cablevision, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d at 841.
38. TeleCable Corp., 19 F.C.C.2d at 578.
39. Warrensburg Cable, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d at 919.
40. UTI applied for the Warrensburg franchise, but it was awarded to an independent
operator. UM refused to allow the independent franchise to attach to its poles. Ultimately,
UTI was awarded a second franchise for the same service area as the independent. With the
aid of UM, UTI quickly overbuilt the independent operator. Id. at 944-45.
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United's monopoly position as a communications common carrier to obtain
a CATV franchise and with its aid engaged in anticompetitive conduct to
eliminate an independent CATV competitor.41 Due in part to these types of
practices, the Commission began to regulate common carrier involvement in
the cable television industry.42
II. FCC ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE ORDER TO THE
TELCO/CATV RELATIONSHIP
Initially, the FCC was reluctant to become involved in the regulation of
cable television. The Communications Act of 1934,13 which granted the
Commission primary jurisdiction over "all interstate and foreign communi-
cation by wire or radio," ' made no mention of cable television, which had
not yet been invented. For some time the FCC asserted that it had no juris-
diction to regulate this new communications medium.
A. Section 214 Certification and Cable/Telco Cross-Ownership Ban
In the late 1960's, however, growing tensions between telephone compa-
nies and cable television systems prompted the Commission to take steps to
structure this volatile relationship. Therefore, in 1966, the Commission be-
gan to examine telco involvement in cable television. Shortly thereafter, the
Commission decided that telco construction of cable distribution facilities
(channel service) was a common carrier activity that affected interstate com-
munications and, therefore, required the filing of tariffs with the Commis-
sion.4" Then, in 1968, the Commission ordered telephone companies to file
for certificates of public convenience under section 214 of the Communica-
tions Act before instituting construction of facilities to provide cable televi-
sion channel service.46 Section 214 applications are reviewed by the
41. Id.
42. See 2 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 9.11. But see infra note 51 and accompany-
ing text.
43. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982).
45. The Commission's first action required AT&T and GTE to file tariffs with the FCC
for channel service offerings. Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C.2d 257
(1966).
46. General Telephone Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448 (1968), affid sub nom. General Telephone
Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). The legal issue
presented in this proceeding was whether a certificate of public necessity and convenience
pursuant to § 214(a) of the Communications Act must be obtained by a telephone company
before undertaking the construction of distribution facilities to provide channel service to a
CATV system. Id. at 453. Section 214(a) provides:
(a) No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an extension of
any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension thereof, or shall engage in
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Commission to determine whether "the present or future public convenience
and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or con-
struction and operation, of such additional or extended line."47
In its decision requiring section 214 certification, the Commission adopted
a fairly strict and literal construction of the statute based primarily on an
earlier holding that the provision of cable service distribution facilities by a
telephone company constituted a common carrier service.4" To bring this
common carrier service within the ambit of section 214 regulation, the Com-
mission had to substantiate that the service provided was interstate in na-
ture. The Commission stated that the cable facilities furnished by the
telephone company are links in "the continuous transmission of signals from
point of origin to the set of the viewer." Therefore, the Commission found
that the common carrier participating as a link in the relay of interstate
television signals is performing an interstate communications service.49 This
transmission over or by means of such additional or extended line, unless and until
there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present
or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or
operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line: Pro-
vided, That no such certificate shall be required under this section for the construc-
tion, acquisition, or operation of (1) a line within a single State unless such line
constitutes part of an interstate line, (2) local, branch, or terminal lines not exceeding
ten miles in length, or (3) any line acquired under section 221 or 222 of this title:
Provided further, That the Commission may, upon appropriate request being made,
authorize temporary or emergency service, or the supplementing of existing facilities,
without regard to the provisions of this section. No carrier shall discontinue, reduce,
or impair service to a community, or part of a community, unless and until there
shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that neither the pres-
ent nor future public convenience and necessity will be adversely affected thereby;
except that the Commission may, upon appropriate request being made, authorize
temporary or emergency discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, or par-
tial discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, without regard to the provi-
sions of this section. As used in this section the term 'line' means any channel of
communication established by the use of appropriate equipment, other than a chan-
nel of communication established by the interconnection of two or more existing
channels: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed to re-
quire a certificate or other authorization from the Commission for any installation,
replacement, or other changes in plant, operation, or equipment, other than new
construction, which will not impair the adequacy or quality of service provided.
47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1982).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1982).
48. General Telephone Co., 413 F.2d at 399. See Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Sys-
tems, 4 F.C.C.2d at 260.
49. The telephone companies argued that even if the service is part of an interstate line,
construction of channel service facilities involves "local, branch or terminal lines not exceeding
ten miles in length and [is] therefore exempt pursuant to § 214(a)(2) of the Act." The Com-
mission rejected this argument stating that § 214(a)(2) was intended to apply to minor addi-
tions or improvements to existing services, not to new construction on a scale envisioned with
channel service offerings. General Telephone Co., 13 F.C.C.2d at 461.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
regulation led shortly thereafter to the issuance of the Commission's cable/
telco cross-ownership rules.5"
In its cable/telco telephone cross-ownership order, the Commission as-
sessed the impact of telephone company ownership or control of CATV sys-
tems within the service area of the telephone company. The Commission
found that such concentration of control over the communications media of
a community could operate against the interests of both nonaffiliated cable
systems and the general public. The public interest would best be served, the
Commission decided, by preserving a competitive environment for the devel-
opment and use of broadband facilities and services.5
To prevent such anticompetitive concentration, the Commission estab-
lished that no telephone company's application for section 214 certification,
within its areas of service, would be granted absent a showing that the appli-
cant company is wholly unaffiliated with its proposed CATV customer.52
Moreover, agreements between telephone companies and their affiliates for
the use of pole or conduit space in their local telephone exchange service
areas would be prohibited. 53 Underscoring this commitment to the preser-
vation of competition, the Commission emphatically stated that it would
"broadly interpret the concept of affiliation between the telephone company
50. In re Application of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307,
reconsidered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), af'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. S.W. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). The Commission stated that the precipitating factor
underlying the rulemaking was the filing of 17 applications for authority under § 214 of the
Communications Act to construct or operate channel facilities for a CATV system. Every
application indicated some degree of ownership affiliation between the telephone company ap-
plicant and the CATV customers to be served. The Commission authorized this rulemaking to
resolve the question of whether telephone companies, either directly or through a subsidiary,
should be permitted to offer CATV service to the public. Telephone Companies for Section
214, 21 F.C.C.2d at 308.
St. Telephone Companies for Section 214, 21 F.C.C.2d at 326. While the Commission
did not specifically find that anticompetitive behavior existed, it argued "that the prevention of
such possible abuses fully warrant[s] our policy findings herein, and the new rules which will
implement them." Id. at 329. See Gordon, Levy & Pierce, FCC Policy on Cable Ownership,
Staff Report, Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans & Policy (November 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Ownership Report]. The Commission concluded that telephone ownership
of CATV systems could exclude others from entry into that service. It recognized that such
ownership would extend the telephone companies' monopoly position to broadband cable facil-
ities and to the new and different services such facilities are expected to provide in the future.
The Commission envisioned a day when such broadband facilities will be the gateway to a
wide variety of different "high-tech" services. The purpose of this rulemaking was to insure
against any "arbitrary blockage of this gateway." Telephone Companies for Section 214, 21
F.C.C.2d at 329.
52. Telephone Companies for Section 214, 21 F.C.C.2d at 327.
53. Id.
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and its proposed CATV customer . ... 14
The FCC also addressed the problem of restrictive pole leasing practices.
Accordingly, a section 214 applicant would be required to show that the
customer CATV system had access to pole attachment or conduit space "(a)
at reasonable charges, and (b) without undue restrictions on the uses that
may be made of the channel by the customer" and that this option was made
known to both the CATV system and the local franchise authority before the
local franchise was awarded. 55
Thus, the FCC has used section 214 certification as a tool to monitor tele-
phone company involvement in many areas of CATV development. It rec-
ognized the broad potential of cable technology and the sorts of restrictive
practices that phone companies could employ in their efforts to subvert
CATV growth.
5 6
According to the Commission's recent decisions, the telephone company
can only act as a facilities provider for the delivery of cable service.5 7 The
54. Id. at 325-26.
55. Id. at 326.
56. Id. at 529-30.
At this point it is impossible to foresee, let alone to provide for, the needed policy
or regulatory guidance as to [future uses of broadband channels]. However, we ex-
pect to give continued consideration to all new wide spectrum service offerings, and
will continue to encourage full and free competition in the development of such serv-
ices under appropriate tariffs by all interested parties.
Id. An example of the Commission's diligence in this task is reflected in the amendments to
tariffs filed by telephone companies that chose to continue to offer channel service after the
cross-ownership decision. Under the original NY Tariff, supra note 25, channel service was
furnished to customers for the primary purpose of distributing broadcast television program
material received off-the-air directly, or indirectly from standard broadcast stations to the tele-
vision sets of all patrons. The cable operator was prohibited from distributing any communi-
cation other than the standard broadcast programming. After the Commission implemented
the § 214 requirement, NY Telephone amended its tariff to allow distribution of any form of
communications including two-way service. See NY Tariff, supra note 25, at 8.
57. In areas where cable service is possible only if provided by a telephone company, a
waiver of the cross-ownership rules would be considered to expedite the provision of service.
Telephone Companies for Section 214, 21 F.C.C.2d at 326. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.56 (1984). The
Commission instituted a waiver presumption policy in jurisdictions with population densities
of less than 30 homes passed per cable mile. See VHF TV Top 100 Market, 81 F.C.C.2d 233
(1980). The cross-ownership ban may also be waived upon a showing of "good cause." See 47
C.F.R. § 63.56 (1984). As of April 1981, waivers had been granted in 96 cases. See Noam,
supra note 8, at 243 n. 152 (citing FCC Master Waiver Log, reported in National Cable Televi-
sion Association, Comments to the FCC, FCC Docket No. 80-767, April 1981).
To encourage development of cable service in rural areas, in 1981 the Commission again
supplemented its waiver policy by granting an exemption from the telephone/cable cross-own-
ership rules for common carriers serving "rural areas." CATV Cross-Ownership Rules, 88
F.C.C.2d 566 (1982), partial reconsideration denied, 91 F.C.C.2d 622 (1983). This exemption,
codified in 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1984), applies to a carrier in any area in which no cable system
presently exists or is under construction and an area which does not contain:
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maximum level of involvement that a telephone company may choose is to
lease full channel service to independent cable operators in its service area.
Alternatively, the telco may opt simply to provide pole or conduit space for
the carriage of independently constructed, owned and operated cable lines.
As a result of these regulatory initiatives, independent telephone compa-
nies were forced to divest their CATV service subsidiaries.58 In addition,
any telephone company seeking section 214 authority to offer channel
service within its service area is now required to show that it is not related or
affiliated in any way with the proposed customer CATV system, that it will
exercise no control over the broadband facilities, and that the independent
cable operator was allowed the option of constructing its own facilities.5 9
In conjunction with the Commission's adoption of the section 214 proce-
dure came the decline of channel service offerings.' Channel service could
(1) Any incorporated place of 2,500 inhabitants or more, or any part thereof;
(2) Any unincorporated place of 2,500 inhabitants or more, or any part thereof; or
(3) Any other territory, incorporated or unincorporated, included in an urbanized
area.
47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1984). The Commission's telephone/cable cross-ownership rules do not
bar common carriers from owning cable systems outside of their service area. The carrier,
however, had been required to obtain construction authority under § 214 of the Communica-
tions Act. Recently, the Commission eliminated the § 214 requirement, stating that the cost of
CATV facilities outside of a carrier's service area would not be subjected to cross-subsidies
from the carrier's rate base. The Commission decided that separate accounting mechanisms
would provide adequate protection and that Commission oversight was no longer necessary.
See Report and Order, In re Blanket 214 Authorization for Provision by a Telephone Common
Carrier of Lines for its Cable Television and Other Noncommon Carrier Services Outside its
Telephone Service Area, 98 F.C.C.2d 354 (1984).
58. Telephone Companies for Section 214, 21 F.C.C.2d at 326. Most recently, the Com-
mission issued a cease and desist order against Northwestern Indiana Telephone Company,
Inc. (NITCO) and Northwest Indiana CATV, Inc., d/b/a Northwestern Indiana CableVision
(Northwest Cable) for violation of the Communications Act and the Commission's cable/telco
cross-ownership rules. The Commission found that NITCO and Northwest Cable were "affili-
ated" companies within the meaning of the cross-ownership rules and that NITCO also vio-
lated these rules and § 214(a) of the Act by constructing cable TV distribution facilities within
its telephone service area without prior Commission authorization. NITCO was ordered to
terminate any affiliation with Northwest Cable and divest itself of any facilities prohibited by
the cross-ownership rules. Furthermore, NITCO was notified of an Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture in the amount of $20,000 for willful and repeated violations of Commission rules.
See Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re
Comark Cable Fund III d/b/a CCI Cablevision v. Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. and North-
west Indiana CATV, Inc. d/b/a Northwestern Indiana Cablevision, File No. E-84-1, F.C.C.
No. 85-116 (released Mar. 18, 1985).
59. In communities where the telephone company did not seek § 214 authorization to
provide channel service, pole attachment policies would not be subjected to FCC attention.
Therefore, cable operators with their own distribution facilities would remain at the mercy of
the local telephone and utility companies for pole and conduit space.
60. See 1 CABLE TV LAW, supra note 2, at 9.15 n.1. In practice, the leaseback of
telephone company-provided facilities has been uncommon. One reason for this scarcity, how-
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no longer be used by independent telephone companies to benefit their
divested CATV subsidiaries. More importantly, any telephone company
that applied for section 214 authority to construct and market channel serv-
ice facilities surrendered its ability to control CATV systems through manip-
ulation of attachment prices.61 Not surprisingly, telephone companies lost
interest in channel service and used their power over pole attachments as the
prevailing means of influencing competition from cable operators.
B. Pole Attachment Act Provides Cable Operators with Greater Access
In 1975, responding to strong encouragement from the Commission,
AT&T and the National Cable Television Association (NCTA) negotiated
an agreement regarding pole attachment rates. This agreement was binding
only on AT&T and its affiliates, however, and most other pole providers
refused to respect it. Despite concerns voiced by the cable industry, the
FCC maintained that it had no jurisdiction over what it considered to be
private agreements entered into between telephone or other utility compa-
nies and cable operators regarding the lease of pole space.62 As a result, a
full 70% of the available poles remained unregulated for some time.63 Ulti-
mately it was left to Congress to grant regulatory authority in this area,
which it did with passage of the Communications Act Amendments of
1978.6
One section of the 1978 amendments, known as the Pole Attachment
Act,65 granted the FCC regulatory authority to provide for just and reason-
able rates, terms and conditions in cable television pole attachments.66 A
"just and reasonable" rate was defined as one which allows the pole provider
ever, may be the Commission's effort to discourage telephone company ownership of cable
facilities. Ownership Report, supra note 51, at 113 n.7.
61. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.57 (1984). Prior to the 1978 Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 224 (1982), the FCC had jurisdiction over pole attachment matters only if a telephone com-
pany sought § 214 authority to construct facilities for lease to cable operators. By simply
declining to offer channel service facilities, telephone companies could immunize their pole
attachment policies from federal jurisdiction. See California Water & Telephone Co., 64
F.C.C.2d 753, 758 (1977). Therefore, in order to continue to control the development of the
cable industry, by manipulation of the process for essential pole attachments, most telephone
companies discontinued channel service. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 210.
62. California Water & Telephone Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 753 (1977).
63. Seven million of the ten million available poles were controlled by independent tele-
phone and utility companies who were not party to the agreement. See Siegel, The History of
Cable Television Pole Attachment Regulation, COM. & L., Dec. 1984, at 9-22.
64. Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 33, 35 (1978).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (1982), states in pertinent part that "the Commission shall regu-
late the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and
conditions are just and reasonable ...."
66. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1) (1982) states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
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to cover his costs without exceeding a mathematical determination of that
portion of his costs which should be directly attributable to the attachment
sought to be created.67
The Commission established the following mathematical formula in its
rules68 pursuant to the Act's definition of just and reasonable rates:
Space Occupied By CATV 69
Maximum Rate = Total Usable Space (Op. Expenses+ Capital Costs of Poles)
Refusing to become primary arbiter of all pole attachment agreements, the
Commission further provided detailed complaint procedures 70 requiring that
all possible attempts be made toward private resolution of the problem
before a complaint is brought. 7 1 In addition, the FCC placed on the com-
plainant the burden of showing unreasonableness. 72 Failure to meet these
requirements, as well as the existence of preempting state regulation, were
made grounds for dismissal of pole attachment complaints.7 3
C. A First Amendment Right of Access
Perhaps the most dramatic and far reaching development regarding pole
attachments is the recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles. 74 Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc., an unsuccessful applicant for the Los Angeles
cable television franchise, 75 asked the court of appeals to decide whether a
city may, consistent with the first amendment, use the franchising process to
limit cable operators' access to public facilities (e.g., pole attachments or
underground conduit). The court decided that if these public facilities are
physically capable of accommodating more than one additional wire, then
the municipality may not stop an unfranchised operator from using such
facilities to effect his free speech rights. An apparent result of the court's
decision is that utilities and telcos with available capacity cannot deny access
apply to, or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to rates, terms, and conditions for
pole attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a State." See infra note 100.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1) (1982).
68. Subpart J. Rules For the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.1409(c) (1983).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 1.1404.
71. Id. § 1.1404(i).
72. Id. § 1.1409(b).
73. Id. § 1.1406.
74. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied (June 13, 1985).
75. The City of Los Angeles refused Preferred Communications, Inc.'s (PCI) request for a
franchise because PCI had failed to participate in the city's auction process whereby the city
allocates the cable television franchise. Id. at 1401.
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to their poles or conduits by requiring an operator to show that he has a
franchise from the city.7 6
The court refused to decide the validity of any specific requirements called
for by the city's franchising process. In particular, the court avoided the
issue of whether a city may require cable operators to turn over channels for
use by the government, by educational institutions, and by the public. But in
a footnote, the court stated that the mandatory access and leased access re-
quirements contained in the city's franchising scheme and called for by sec-
tions 611 and 612 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 "pose
particularly troubling constitutional questions." '77 The case was remanded
to the district court to resolve the factual issue of whether the City of Los
Angeles violated Preferred's first amendment rights by refusing access to
public facilities.
This decision could provide the impetus for a new competitive environ-
ment within the cable industry. In those cities with additional capacity in
their public facilities, the door has been opened to unfranchised competitors.
Just as cable operators are being freed of the franchise requirement, the
Commission is considering whether to grant telcos blanket authority to con-
struct cable distribution facilities.
III. FCC PROPOSES THAT SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LINES AND
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDED BY COMMON CARRIERS
RECEIVE BLANKET AUTHORIZATION
On April 30, 1984, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
76. See id. at 1409.
77. Id. at 1401 n.4. The court found that
imposing access requirements on the press would no doubt be invalid. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). [However,] [c]ourts have
divided as to the effect of the Tornillo holding on the validity of access requirements
imposed on cable television operators. Compare Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571
F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that to the extent the government's
interest in imposing such requirements stems from the economic scarcity of the cable
medium, the Supreme Court's decision in Tornillo casts considerable doubt on the
government's ability to do so), affd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) with Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 n.82 (D.C. Cir.) (suggesting that, unlike the
right of reply statute involved in Tornillo, which was triggered by the publication of
certain items, rules requiring cable operators to dedicate channels to common carrier
use would not diminish the overall diversity of cable programming or deter the pres-
entation of controversial material regarding public figures), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977) and Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 983-88
(D.R.I. 1983) (upholding franchising procedure that required applicants to provide
access channels for governmental, educational, and public use). We decline to reach
this question.
Id. (parallel citations omitted).
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ing that offered to dispense with the traditional common carrier treatment of
special construction of lines and special service arrangements.78 Specifically,
the Notice proposes to: (1) grant carriers blanket section 214 authorization
for special activities; (2) disallow the filing of tariffs for special activities;
(3) require the costs of special activities for regulated activities to be kept on
separate books of account; and (4) require carriers to file semiannual reports
listing each of their special activity projects with a brief description of the
facilities and services to be provided.79
The Commission's proposal to deregulate the special activities of common
carriers most notably proposes to eliminate the section 214 requirements.
80
This follows an attempt to remove title II oversight of common carrier activ-
ities for which regulation may be unnecessary to protect or to promote con-
sumer interests. This deregulatory initiative has been in place at the FCC
for a number of years and has recently received an increased momentum
from the current procompetitive philosophy at the Commission.81
A number of parties responded to the Commission's proposed rule
change. Comments varied from strongly in favor of to strongly against the
proposed change. Most of the BOCs and AT&T supported the deregulation
of special activities.8 2 The telephone companies, however, differed as to the
scope of and rationale for such a deregulatory initiative. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. argued that special construction should be deregulated only
where the underlying associated service has been deregulated. 3 In contrast,
Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell argued that only stand-alone activities are non-
common carrier and thus are the only service that should operate free of
78. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Special Construction of Lines and Special Service
Arrangements Provided by Common Carriers, 97 F.C.C.2d 978 (1984).
79. Id. at 981-82.
80. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text. The proposed rulemaking does not
specifically equate construction of broadband facilities for CATV systems with special con-
struction or special activities. According to FCC officials, however, construction of CATV
facilities fits within the definition of these special activities.
Special construction of line and special service arrangements (collectively referred to as spe-
cial activities) are those services that are individually tailored and priced in response to a
customer's request where ordinary tariffed (generally offered) services would not satisfy that
request. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 97 F.C.C.2d at 981-82.
81. See, e.g., Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), afl'd sub nom. Computer
and Communications Industry Assoc. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2109 (1983); see also Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, Fourth Report and Order (CC
Docket 79,252), F.C.C. 83-481 (Nov. 2, 1983).
82. See, e.g., Comments of American Telephone & Telegraph, C.C. Doc. 84-369 (July 3,
1984).
83. Comments of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., C.C. Doc. No. 84-369 (July 3, 1984), at 5-
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regulation.84 Bell Atlantic questioned the Commission's conclusion that
special activities do not fit within the definition of "common carriage" and
therefore should not be regulated. Instead, Bell Atlantic suggested that the
Commission should treat these special activities as candidates for regulatory
forbearance rather than as being entirely outside the Commission's
jurisdiction. 85
Opposition to the proposal came primarily from the cable industry. The
National Cable Television Association (NCTA) filed comments urging the
proposed rulemaking be limited. NCTA stressed that the Commission's ef-
forts to detariff should be "de minimis"-with special activities being imple-
mented in a precise and certain manner. NCTA urged the adoption of
dollar and duration limitations to justify further the Commission's treatment
of minor "special activities" without an undue risk to monopoly ratepayers
that would accompany the deregulation of activities in a full market or in
too broad a context. 86 Further, NCTA argued that the current regulatory
scheme for cable distribution facilities remains outside the scope of the pro-
posed rulemaking.87
Obviously, the proposed rulemaking has broad implications on the way in
which telephone companies will be involved in cable television construction
and operation over the next few years. This rulemaking has the potential to
eliminate the regulatory barriers imposed by the FCC to telco involvement
in the construction of lines and special arrangements for cable systems.
While the cable/telco cross-ownership rules would not be dramatically af-
fected, clearly the final rulemaking could encourage further telco involve-
ment in the construction and maintenance of cable systems.
IV. THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT OF 1984
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 198488 (Cable Act) incorpo-
rated into the Communications Act of 1934 a coherent national policy con-
cerning cable communications. The Cable Act established franchise
procedures to encourage the growth and development of the cable industry
and to assure that cable systems are responsible to the needs of the local
community. Guidelines for the exercise of federal, state, and local authority
84. Comments of Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell, C.C. Doc. No. 84-369 (July 3, 1984).
85. Comments of Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies, C.C. Doc. No. 84-369 (July 3,
1984), at 2.
86. See Comments of the National Cable Television Assoc., C.C. Doc. No. 84-369 (July 3,
1984), at 2, 12.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611 (West Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as Cable Act].
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
were instituted to minimize unnecessary regulations, and specific cable sys-
tem ownership restrictions were incorporated to promote competition in
cable communications.8 9
The Cable Act represents a compromise between the cable industry and
the cities. The Act assures that the cable industry will receive reasonable
franchise fees9° as well as standardized renewal procedures.9 Alternatively,
the Act codifies municipal authority to negotiate with CATV operators for
service and facility requirements for the community92 and provides protec-
89. Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2780-86.
90. Section 622 of the Cable Act states, in part:
(a) Subject to the limitations of subsection (b), any cable operator may be required
under the terms of any franchise to pay a franchise fee.
(b) For any twelve-month period, the franchise fees paid by a cable operator with
respect to any cable system shall not exceed 5 percent of such cable operator's gross
revenues derived in such period from the operation of the cable system. For pur-
poses of this section, the 12-month period shall be the 12-month period applicable
under the franchise for accounting purposes. Nothing in this subsection shall pro-
hibit a franchising authority and a cable operator from agreeing that franchise fees
which lawfully could be collected for any such 12-month period shall be paid on a
prepaid or deferred basis; except that the sum of the fees paid during the term of the
franchise may not exceed the amount, including the time value of money, which
would have lawfully been collected if such fees had been paid per annum.
Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2787, 47 U.S.C.A. § 542 (West Supp. 1985).
91. Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2791-93, 47 U.S.C.A. § 546 (West Supp. 1985).
92. Section 624 of the Cable Act states:
(a) Any franchising authority may not regulate the services, facilities, and equip-
ment provided by a cable operator except to the extent consistent with this title.
(b) In the case of any franchise granted after the effective date of this title, the
franchising authority, to the extent related to the establishment or operation of a
cable system-
(1) in its request for proposals for a franchise (including requests for renewal
proposals, subject to section 626), may establish requirements for facilities and
equipment, but may not establish requirements for video programming or other
information services; and
(2) subject to section 625, may enforce any requirements contained within the
franchise-
(A) for facilities and equipment; and
(B) for broad categories of video programming or other services.
(c) In the case of any franchise in effect on the effective date of this title, the
franchising authority may, subject to section 625, enforce requirements contained
within the franchise for the provision of services, facilities, and equipment, whether
or not related to the establishment or operation of a cable system.
(d) (1) Nothing in this title shall be construed as prohibiting a franchising author-
ity and a cable operator from specifying, in a franchise or renewal thereof, that cer-
tain cable services shall not be provided or shall be provided subject to conditions, if
such cable services are obscene or are otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of
the United States.
(2) (A) In order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or
indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator shall provide (by sale
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tion against modification of franchise provisions. 93
or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable
service during periods selected by that subscriber.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall take effect 180 days after the effective date of this
title.
(e) The Commission may establish technical standards relating to the facilities and
equipment of cable systems which a franchising authority may require in the
franchise.
(f) (1) Any Federal agency, State, or franchising authority may not impose re-
quirements regarding the provision or content of cable services, except as expressly
provided in this title.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to-
(A) any rule, regulation, or order issued under any Federal law, as such rule,
regulation, or order (i) was in effect on September 21, 1983, or (ii) may be
amended after such date if the rule, regulation, or order as amended is not in-
consistent with the express provisions of this title; and
(B) any rule, regulation, or order under title 17, United States Code.
Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2789-90, 47 U.S.C.A. § 544 (West Supp. 1985).
93. Section 625 of the Cable Act states:
(a) (1) During the period a franchise is in effect, the cable operator may obtain
from the franchising authority modifications of the requirements in such franchise-
(A) in the case of any such requirement for facilities or equipment, including
public, educational, or governmental access facilities or equipment, if the cable
operator demonstrates that (i) it is commercially impracticable for the operator
to comply with such requirement, and (ii) the proposal by the cable operator for
modification of such requirement is appropriate because of commercial imprac-
ticability; or
(B) in the case of any such requirement for services, if the cable operator
demonstrates that the mix, quality, and level of services required by the
franchise at the time it was granted will be maintained after such modification.
(2) Any final decision by a franchising authority under this subsection shall be
made in a public proceeding. Such decision shall be made within 120 days after
receipt of such request by the franchising authority, unless such 120 day period is
extended by mutual agreement of the cable operator and the franchising authority.
(b) (1) Any cable operator whose request for modification under subsection (a)
has been denied by a final decision of a franchising authority may obtain modification
of such franchise requirements pursuant to the provisions of section 635.
(2) In the case of any proposed modification of a requirement for facilities or
equipment, the court shall grant such modification only if the cable operator dem-
onstrates to the court that-
(A) it is commercially impracticable for the operator to comply with such
requirement; and
(B) the terms of the modification requested are appropriate because of com-
mercial impracticability.
(3) In the case of any proposed modification of a requirement for services, the
court shall grant such modification only if the cable operator demonstrates to the
court that the mix, quality, and level of services required by the franchise at the
time it was granted will be maintained after such modification.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), a cable operator may, upon 30 days'
advance notice to the franchising authority, rearrange, replace, or remove a particu-
lar cable service required by the franchise if-
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This new legislation will allow the franchising authority to establish spe-
cific requirements for the construction of facilities and to provide equipment
for newly franchised systems. The municipality may not, however, establish
requirements for video programming or other information services.9 4 Under
the Act, a municipality may enforce any requirements contained within the
franchise.9 5 In addition, the cable operator may not alter the agreement un-
less it can be shown that execution of its provisions is commercially imprac-
ticable9 6 or that the integrity of the cable services will be maintained after
such modification.
97
A. Cable/Telco Cross-Ownership Restrictions in the Cable Act
Section 613 of the Cable Act incorporates the general language of the
Commission's cross-ownership rules.98 Paragraph 1 prohibits common car-
riers from providing "video programming" within its telephone service
area.99 Common carriers are also prohibited, under paragraph 2, from pro-
(1) such service is no longer available to the operator; or
(2) such service is available to the operator only upon the payment of a royalty
required under section 801(b)(2) of title 17, United States Code, which the cable
operator can document-
(A) is substantially in excess of the amount of such payment required on the
date of the operator's offer to provide such service, and
(B) has not been specifically compensated for through a rate increase or other
adjustment.
(d) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), a cable operator may take such ac-
tions to rearrange a particular service from one service tier to another, or otherwise
offer the service, if the rates for all of the service tiers involved in such actions are not
subject to regulation under section 623.
(e) A cable operator may not obtain modification under this section of any re-
quirement for services relating to public, educational, or governmental access.
(f) For purposes of this section, the term 'commercially impracticable' means,
with respect to any requirement applicable to a cable operator, that it is commer-
cially impracticable for the operator to comply with such requirement as a result of a
change in conditions which is beyond the control of the operator and the nonoccur-
rence of which was a basic assumption on which the requirement was based.
Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2790-91, 47 U.S.C.A. § 545 (West Supp. 1985).
94. See supra note 92, at § 624(b)(1).
95. See id. § 624(b)(2).
96. See supra note 93, at § 625(a)(1)(A).
97. See id. § 625(a)(1)(B).
98. States and franchising authorities may hold ownership interest in any cable system
provided the authority does not exercise any editorial control regarding the content of any
cable service on a cable system in which such authority has an ownership interest. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 63.54-.58 (1983).
99. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1983). Section 613, subsection (b), paragraph 1 of the Cable
Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to title II
of this Act, to provide video programming directly to subscribers in its telephone
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viding channel facilities or pole attachments to any related entity that would
use such facilities to deliver video programming within the service area of
the carrier."°° Paragraph 3 incorporates the rural area exemption,101 while
paragraph 4 establishes the criteria for waiver of the ownership
restrictions. 0 2
Substitution of the term "video programming" for the term "cable televi-
service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by,
controlled by, or under common control with the common carrier.
Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2785, 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
100. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(b) (1983). Section 613, subsection (b), paragraph 2 of the Cable
Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to title II
of this Act, to provide channels of communications or pole line conduit space, or
other rental arrangements, to any entity which is directly or indirectly owned by,
operated by, controlled by, or under common control with such common carrier, if
such facilities or arrangements are to be used for, or in conection with, the provision
of video programming directly to subscribers in the telephone service area of the com-
mon carrier.
See Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2785, 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
The Act also amended § 224(c) of the Communications Act concerning pole attachment:
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a State shall not be considered to regulate the
rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments-
(A) unless the State has issued and made effective rules and regulations imple-
menting the State's regulatory authority over pole attachments; and
(B) with respect to any individual matter, unless the State takes final action on a
complaint regarding such matter-
(i) within 180 days after the complaint is filed with the State, or
(ii) within the applicable period prescribed for such final action in such rules
and regulations of the State, if the prescribed period does not extend beyond 360
days after the filing of such complaint.
98 Stat. at 2801-02, 47 U.S.C.A. § 224(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 66 and accom-
panying text.
101. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1983). Section 613, subsection (b), paragraph 3 of the Cable
Act states: "This subsection shall not apply to any common carrier to the extent such carrier
provides telephone exchange service in any rural area (as defined by the Commission)." See
Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2785, 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
102. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.56 (1983). Section 613, subsection (b), paragraph 4 of the Cable
Act states:
In those areas where the provision of video programming directly to subscribers
through a cable system demonstrably could not exist except through a cable system
owned by, operated by, controlled by, or affiliated with the common carrier involved,
or upon other showing of good cause, the Commission may, on petition for waiver,
waive the applicability of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. Any such waiver
shall be made in accordance with section 63.56 of title 47, Code of Federal Regula-
tions (as in effect September 20, 1984) and shall be granted by the Commission upon
a finding that the issuance of such waiver is justified by the particular circumstances
demonstrated by the petitions, taking into account the policy of this subsection.
See Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2785, 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b)(4) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
The legislative history of the Cable Act indicates that the policy underlying § 613(b) is that
telephone companies should not provide video programming directly to subscribers in their
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sion programming" is the sole distinction between subsection (b) of the
Cable Act and the Commission's preexisting cable/telco cross-ownership
rules. The legislative history of the Cable Act specifies that the term "video
programming"'103 is not intended to include the transmission of information
that is primarily textual in nature, even though broadcast stations have been
granted authority to provide such information generally known as
teletext. 104 The term "video programming" appears to narrow the scope of
the Cable Act's ownership restrictions.
B. Noncable Services
While the cross-ownership rules prevent competition between the cable
operators and telephone companies for provision of video programming,
there are new areas of service developing in which the two industries will
compete head on. Taking advantage of the two-way capacity of cable sys-
tems, some cable operators have begun to provide communications services
traditionally offered by the telephone company. Some cable systems with
institutional networks already compete with the local telephone company in
the rapidly growing data transmission market.1"5 Although such private
line data services are still in the developing stages and do not yet represent a
significant percentage of telephone company revenue, they are growing at
the rate of 28% a year.106
Another area of competition between cable operators and telephone com-
panies is the use of cable systems for the origination and termination of long
distance voice and data traffic. Several cable systems have proposed to offer
their institutional customers the capacity to connect directly with MCI or
AT&T, bypassing the local telephone company entirely.107
telephone service areas. 130 CONG. REC. S 14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood).
103. Video programming is defined by § 602(16) of the Cable Act as programming pro-
vided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided by a television broad-
cast station. See Cable Act, supra note 88.
104. See 130 CONG. REC. S14,285 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
105. One example is Manhattan Cable (MC), which provides point to point data services to
its institutional network customers throughout Manhattan. Businesses are attracted to cable
distribution systems because broadband facilities can carry data at higher speed and offer
higher quality, as compared to the dedicated line service of the local phone company. MC's
earnings as of December 1984 from such services were approximately $1 million as opposed to
New York Telephone's dedicated line revenues of $4 billion. 584 Telecom Highlights, No. 49,
Dec. 12, 1984, at 13-14. See supra note 30.
106. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Cable Report]
(quoting the California Public Utilities Commission).
107. Manhattan Cable and Commline, the institutional cable network of Cox Cable Com-
munications, Inc. in Omaha, Nebraska, are examples of cable systems that have proposed to
offer such services.
[Vol. 34:697
Telco-Constructed Broadband Services
The question of regulation of these new communications services has been
the subject of discussion at both the state and federal level. The New York
Public Service Commission (PSC) ruled in October 1983 that Manhattan
Cable was offering "telephone service for hire" and, therefore, was required
to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the PSC.'° 8
Also in 1983, the Nebraska Public Service Commission (NPSC) invoked ju-
risdiction over Commline, the institutional cable network of Cox Cable
Communications, Inc. The NPSC ordered Commline to cease and desist
operations until a certificate of public convenience and necessity was ob-
tained. Subsequently, Cox Cable petitioned the FCC to preempt any state
regulation of such services.' 09 Most recently, on June 13, 1984, the Califor-
nia Public Utilities Commission released an order that adopted regulations
regarding alternative supplies of local private line services, including cable
systems. 110
The authors of the Cable Act did not attempt to resolve the regulatory
issues presented by these potentially lucrative services. In fact, the Act pre-
serves the status quo of regulation of these new communications systems."'
108. 584 TELECOM HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 105, at 13. Manhattan Cable has filed an
application which is being held in abeyance while NYPSC is investigating the general "bypass"
problem. Id.
109. In re Cox Cable Communications, Inc., Commline, Inc., and Cox DTS, Inc. (CCB-
DFD 83-1).
Pursuant to § 1.2 of the Commission's Rules, Cox Cable Communications, Inc. (Cox) and
others petitioned the Commission for a declaratory ruling that: (1) this Commission has juris-
diction over (and has preempted state and local regulation of) facilities located wholly within
one state and used to originate, distribute, or terminate interstate communications including
such facilities which also distribute intrastate communications; and (2) "institutional" broad-
band coaxial cable providing interactive (two-way) local distribution of inter- and intrastate
communications, whether on a "stand-alone" basis or via interconnection with Digital Termi-
national Systems (DTS) operating in the same area, constitute but another manifestation of
such intrastate facilities.
110. See Cable Report, supra note 106, at 29.
111. Id. at 60. The key to future regulatory battles involving new cable offerings will be the
Act's definition of "cable service." Ifa cable system offering fits within the definition of a cable
service, then the state PUC is preempted from regulating that service as a common carrier.
Section 602(5) of the Act defines cable services:
(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii)
other programming service, and
(B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection of such video
programming or other programming service . ...
See Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2780, 47 U.S.C.A. § 522(5) (West Supp. 1985).
The legislative history of the Act specifies that this definition does not include such services
as private line data transmission or video communications that compete with services provided
by telephone companies. "Thus, the definition of other programming service requires that the
information provided in a cable service must be made available to all subscribers generally and
may not include information that is subscriber-specific." Cable Report, supra note 106, at 41.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
Subsection (c) of section 621 of the Act prohibits the regulation of a cable
system as a common carrier or utility by reason of providing cable service.
However, the drafters of the Act have stated that subsection (c) has no effect
upon the proceedings before the New York PSC or Cox Cable's petition
before the FCC because they concern noncable services.1 12 The framers of
the Cable Act left the decision concerning the exercise of regulatory author-
ity over noncable services to the appropriate regulatory bodies. This ap-
proach was chosen because "it protects cable companies from unnecessary
regulation, while reserving for state and federal officials the authority they
need to address the issue of competition between telephone and cable
companies."" 3
To aid state and federal officials in this task, the Cable Act empowers the
states or the FCC, if they so choose, to require cable operators to provide
informational tariffs. 14 Under section 621(d), tariffs would be required for
any noncable service that would be subject to regulation by the FCC or any
state if offered by a title II common carrier. Subsection (d) was designed to
assure the effective monitoring of these new services and was not intended to
create new or additional regulatory authority over noncable services.'"
5
These noncable services, such as intrastate and interstate voice and data
transmission, provide cable operators with the opportunity to expand their
commercial potential while more fully utilizing their broadband facilities.
The cable industry, however, faces protracted regulatory battles over its en-
try into these previously exclusive telephone service markets. The telephone
industry in the post-divestiture world must now compete with cable opera-
tors for institutional customers that were once taken for granted. As noted,
the Cable Act does not directly address this new area of cable-telco competi-
tion. The participation of the BOCs in these new competitive markets is,
however, subject to the provisions of the Modified Final Judgment."16
V. BROADBAND SERVICES UNDER THE MODIFIED FINAL JUDGMENT:
WAIVER OR NOT?
The Bell System was divested on January 1, 1984 under the 1982 Justice
112. Cable Report, supra note 106, at 61.
113. Id.
114. Cable Act, 98 Stat. at 2786.
115. See Cable Report, supra note 106, at 60.
116. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affld sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
1240 (1983). The legislative history of the Cable Act provided that § 613(b) does not override
restrictions on electronic publishing imposed by court decree, agency order, or otherwise in-
cluding but not limited to the Modified Final Judgment. 130 CONG. REC. H12,235 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
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Department/AT&T Consent Decree approved by United States District
Court Judge Harold Green in the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ)." 17
Under the terms of the MFJ, AT&T was separated from the twenty-two
BOCs, which were organized under seven regional holding companies. The
MFJ altered the 1956 Consent Decree that had prohibited the Bell System
from providing CATV service. With the exception of a seven-year ban on
"electronic publishing," the MFJ has removed all of the line of business re-
strictions imposed upon AT&T under the previous decree."' Electronic
publishing is defined by the MFJ "as the provision of any information which
AT&T or its affiliates has or has caused to be originated, authored, com-
piled, collected or edited or in which it holds either a direct or indirect finan-
cial or proprietary interest and which is disseminated to an unaffiliated
person through some electronic means."' 19 From this definition it could be
argued that AT&T would be restricted from owning or operating a cable
system until 1991, because the operation of a cable system includes collect-
ing and disseminating information to an unaffiliated customer.
The twenty-two BOCs that were divested from AT&T are prohibited
under the consent decree from providing directly or through an affiliate, any
interexchange telecommunications or information services.' 2 ° In fact, BOCs
117. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
118. Id. at 223. The court reasoned that with the loss of control over the local network,
AT&T would no longer be able to disadvantage its competitors; therefore, the restrictions
imposed on AT&T under the 1956 Consent Decree, see supra note 11, will no longer be neces-
sary. 552 F. Supp. at 223.
119. 552 F. Supp. at 225. Judge Green placed the seven-year moratorium on electronic
publishing to insure the basic first amendment value of continued diversity of sources of infor-
mation. Electronic publishing, still in the experimental stage, has the potential to become an
important provider of news, entertainment, and advertising in competition with the more
traditional media formats. Judge Green reasoned that if AT&T were permitted to engage in
both the transmission and generation of information, there would be a substantial risk that
AT&T would discourage the efforts of other electronic publishers and acquire a monopoly
over this new medium of communication. Id. at 223-24.
120. Id. at 224. After divestiture, the BOCs were left with a monopoly over local telephone
service. The Justice Department decided that the BOCs must be barred from entering all
competitive markets to ensure that they will not misuse monopoly power. In addition to a
general prohibition against the provision of any product or service that is not a natural monop-
oly service actually regulated by tariff, the BOCs were banned from the following activities by
§ 11 (D) of the Decree: "(1) The provision of interexchange services; (2) The provision of
information services; (3) The manufacture of telecommunications products and customer
premises equipment; and (4) The marketing of such equipment." Id. at 227-28. BOCs may
now provide enhanced services and customer premises equipment through structurally sepa-
rated entities. See Report and Order, Policy and Rules Concerning the Furnishing of Customer
Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellular Communications Services by the Bell Op-
erating Companies, CC Docket No. 83-115, F.C.C. No. 83-552 (released Dec. 30, 1983), recon-
sideration, FCC Report No. 18,012 (released June 5, 1984), ajfd, Illinois Bell Telephone v.
FCC (7th Cir. No. 84-1145, decided June 29, 1984). If such a service offered a BOC is not
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cannot provide any other product or service except exchange telecommuni-
cations and exchange access service. Under the MFJ, these restrictions may
be waived by the court upon petition showing there is no substantial possibil-
ity that the BOC could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the
proposed market.
121
Following divestiture, some of the regional holding companies began to
file requests for waiver of the line of business restrictions. Reacting to this
demand, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia estab-
lished general guidelines for the evaluation and processing of waiver re-
quests.122 Initially, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reviews the request to
determine if the petitioner met its burden under the MFJ. If the DOJ ap-
proves the waiver, a proposed consent order is submitted to the court.
123
The July 1984 waiver opinion did not address the possibility of a telco ven-
ture into the cable industry through provision of broadband transport
facilities.
In a letter dated February 5, 1985, the Department of Justice announced
that the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company (C & P), a local sub-
sidiary of Bell Atlantic, may provide broadband transport facilities to Dis-
trict Cablevision, Inc. without requesting a waiver of the MFJ. 1 24 The
Justice Department found that the proposed distribution of cable television
signals by means of broadband transport facilities provided by C & P ap-
peared to constitute exchange telecommunications within the definition of
"telecommunication services" contained in the MFJ. 12 5
considered a regulated service under title II, then it may only be offered by the BOC through a
separate subsidiary. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regu-
lations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), reconsidered, 84 F.C.C.2d 50
(1980), further reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affid sub nom. Computer and Com-
munications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2109
(1983).
121. The court found that line of business restrictions upon the BOCs
must be based on an assessment of the realistic circumstances of the relevant mar-
kets, including the operating companies' ability to engage in anti-competitive behav-
ior, their potential contribution to the market as an added competitor for AT&T, as
well as upon the effects of the restrictions on rates for local telephone service.
552 F. Supp. at 221.
122. See United States v. AT&T, No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. July 26, 1984).
123. Id. slip op. at 53-58.
124. Letter from Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divsion,
to Richard C. Shramm, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Bell Atlantic (Feb. 5,
1985) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Charles F. Rule].
125. Id. at 1. The MFJ defines "telecommunications" as
the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent
and received, by means of an electromagnetic transmission medium, including all
instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (including the collection, storage,
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The Justice Department's inquiry was initiated, in part, as a result of com-
plaints filed by Capital City Cable (CCC)'26 on September 26, 1984 and In-
ner City Broadcasting Corp. (ICBC), one of CCC's partners, on October 12,
1984. These parties argued that this joint venture is a new line of business
requiring waiver under the MFJ, even though C & P is reimbursed as the
system is constructed and even though the venture conveys equitable title as
well as control over its design, costs and alternative uses.
127
In support of this argument, ICBC stated that the C & P/DCI plan did
not fall within the definition of telecommunications services. Specifically,
ICBC alleged that C & P was not offering the capacity of communication
facilities, or the transmission of information via such facilities. The Justice
Department discredited ICBC's argument by stating simply that C & P has
previously provided dedicated facilities that were paid for as they were
built. 128
The Justice Department limited its decision by emphasizing that its opin-
ion letter was specifically limited to an analysis under the MFJ restrictions of
C & P's proposal for provision of broadband facilities to DCI. Also, DOJ
stated that its decision did not resolve the question of whether C & P's pro-
posal violated the antitrust laws or presented other competitive problems.129
VI. COMMISSION GRANTS C & P AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT DCI
SYSTEM
In granting C & P's application for section 214 authority to provide the
broadband facilities, the FCC noted "that except for the payment schedule[,]
forwarding, switching, and delivery of such information) essential to such
transmission.
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229.
126. Capital City Cable was an unsuccessful applicant for the Washington, D.C. cable tele-
vision franchise.
127. Letter from Charles F. Rule, supra note 124, at 2.
128. Id. at 3. An example of previous C & P dedicated line service was the construction of
a fiber optic facility for MCI in 1983. Id. at 3 n.4.
129. Letter from Charles F. Rule, supra note 124, at 4. Capital City Cable (CCC), a losing
bidder for the Washington, D.C. cable television franchise, filed suit against members of the
City Council, DCI, and C & P in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Capital City Cable v. District Cablevision, Inc., No. 84-3524 (D.D.C. filed -, 1984). In its
suit, CCC alleged that there was a conspiracy in restraint of trade to award the franchise to
DCI and C & P. CCC contended that the award of the franchise would provide C & P a
monopoly over broadband transport facilities and the provision of cable services in the Dis-
trict.
DCI and CCC reached an out-of-court settlement of the antitrust case on February 20,
1985. The case was formally dismissed by United States District Court Judge Gesell on Febru-
ary 21, 1985. Id. (order dismissing action).
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C & P's proposed tariff is essentially like those on file by other carriers."'' 30
The FCC concluded that C & P's proposal appeared to include the primary
features included in traditional channel service offerings made by other com-
panies. The fact that C & P proposed to recover its costs in a period shorter
than normally associated with channel service did not, according to the
Commission, fundamentally merit voiding the proposal.131 Opponents to
C & P's section 214 application alleged that the structure of the venture
between DCI and C & P provided C & P with the opportunity to cross-
subsidize this venture with revenue from its common carrier business. To
mitigate this anticompetitive potential, the Commission required C & P to
maintain separate books of account for its broadband transport service. The
Commission concluded that C & P's maintenance of the broadband facilities
did not present a substantial likelihood that C & P would restrict competi-
tion. The C & P/DCI proposal is just one of the recent proposals presented
by local telcos and cable television operators that has forged a new relation-
ship between the two industries.
Telephone companies, particularly the BOCs, have traditionally denied
cable systems open access to underground conduit space and pole attach-
ments, retarding the development of some cable television systems. Re-
cently, however, a few telephone companies have aggressively pursued joint
venture agreements with local cable companies in an effort to hasten the
delivery of cable television service to the communities under consideration
for service. Telephone companies seeking to construct cable television sys-
tems have had to maneuver carefully within the web of federal and local
regulations affecting telco involvement in the cable industry. As a result,
aggressive and creative proposals have been offered by local telcos in an ef-
fort to develop joint ventures that are within permissible regulatory guide-
lines, that are technologically feasible, and that are financially secure for all
parties.
VII. WISCONSIN BELL'S PROPOSAL TO THE CITY OF BROOKFIELD,
WISCONSIN
The first of the post-moratorium section 214 applications to receive ap-
130. In re Application of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. for § 214 Authority,
Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certificate, F.C.C. No. 85-48, at 7 (Jan. 30, 1985).
131. Id. The Commission found that the C & P proposal "appears to include the primary
feature included in channel service offerings made by other companies." Id. The Commission
did not find C & P's proposal to recover its costs, in a period shorter than normally associated
with channel service, to be a determinative factor. Id. Instead, the Commission noted that in
a recent proposed rulemaking, it recognized that some carriers' tariffs provide for rapid recov-
ery of costs in "similar situations." Id. at 7 n. 11.
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proval was filed by Wisconsin Bell on January 30, 1984, on the heels of the
AT&T divestiture.' 32 This former BOC, which provides telephone service
to much of the State of Wisconsin, proposed to construct a broadband distri-
bution system to serve Brookfield, Wisconsin, a suburb of Milwaukee.
TeleNational Communications, Inc., the successful cable franchisee, had
contracted with Wisconsin Bell to use the system once construction was
completed.
Wisconsin Bell asserted that its construction of the proposed broadband
cable television distribution system would serve the public interest through
swift and efficient provision of cable service according to the city's express
desire. The system designed for Brookfield would be composed of a single
coaxial cable network of 407 "star nodes" fed by one centrally located head
end facility.133 This one network would provide fifty-four forward and four
reverse channels to serve both the residential and institutional cable needs of
the community. ' 34 All of the proposed channel capacity would be dedicated
to the needs of the cable system with none reserved inactive for later use. If
additional capacity was required to meet future needs, another application
would have to be submitted to request authority for further construction.1 35
Wisconsin Bell would bear sole financial responsibility for the construc-
tion of the system. In its revenue projections, Wisconsin Bell described its
plan to recoup this investment, primarily through charges to TeleNational
for services in fulfillment of its cable franchise commitment and subordi-
nately through charges to other customers who may provide other services,
such as "pay-per-view," polling/data collection, and new entertainment
channels.1 36 In anticipation of possible post-divestiture action by the FCC
or Congress, Wisconsin Bell and TeleNational also entered into a Condi-
tional Purchase Agreement 37 which provided an opportunity for the cable
franchisee to purchase the facilities should the telco be barred from operat-
ing the system and from maintaining a carrier-user relationship with
TeleNational for this service.' 38
132. In re Application of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for § 214 Authority, File No. W-P-C-5348
(filed Jan. 30, 1984).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 5. It is common for broadband distribution systems to be designed with surplus
unactivated channels to allow for future system expansion without additional construction.
Plans may call for this excess capacity to be reserved by the telephone company or dedicated to
the cable system. See infra notes 141, 152 and accompanying text.
136. Application of Wisconsin Bell, File No. W-P-C-5348, at 6. These projections antici-
pate an average annual revenue of $2,108,000, which is potentially $303,000 greater than the
12.75% rate of return required by the telco's tariff.
137. Id. at app. F.
138. Id. at 8-9.
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The Commission approved the proposal, and on August 30, 1984, granted
Wisconsin Bell section 214 authority to construct and operate a broadband
distribution system in Brookfield, Wisconsin. 139 Furthermore, on December
13, 1984, in the face of a subsequent challenge by the unsuccessful cable
franchisee asserting violative pole attachment practices, the Commission re-
affirmed its decision.14°
VIII. THE PACIFIC BELL PROPOSAL TO THE CITY OF
PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA
Pacific Bell submitted an application on March 9, 1984 for section 214
authority to construct and operate a cable television distribution system in
Palo Alto, California.14 ' The arrangement proposed by Pacific Bell repre-
sents what would probably be the highest level of involvement in cable tele-
vision service by a telephone company since the institution of cross-
ownership restrictions. Not only does Pacific Bell intend to reserve channel
capacity on the system that it would lease, it also plans simultaneous con-
struction of an entirely separate network which it would not lease, but would
operate for its sole benefit. Moreover, Pacific Bell has sought to serve cable
customers individually by obtaining section 214 authority.142
The system proposed by Pacific Bell would be a highly sophisticated state-
of-the-art hybrid fiber optic and dual trunk coaxial system.' 43 Authority
was specifically sought for a "subscriber network" which would consist of
112 channels on two coaxial feeder trunks, each affording two-way capacity
in varying degress between Palo Alto and Stanford University.'" In addi-
tion, Pacific Bell would simultaneously construct a separate fiber optic Insti-
tutional Network to provide ancillary business-related services to over eighty
predesignated customers in the area. 4 5
In addition to its unique, innovative technology, the structure of the ven-
ture confirms that the arrangement proposed by Pacific Bell would not be a
traditional cable television leaseback. A significant portion of the Palo Alto
139. Memorandum Opinion and Order, File No. W-P-C-5348, Mimeo No. 6335 (Aug. 30,
1984).
140. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Wisconsin Bell, Inc., F.C.C. No. 84-618
(Dec. 13, 1984).
141. In re Application of Pacific Bell for § 214 Authority, File No. W-P-C-5384 (filed July
2, 1984).
142. The City of Palo Alto had expressed the desire to assume the role of cable service
operator, the necessary result of Pacific's assertion that the city would be its customer. Id.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 4.
145. Response to the City of Palo Alto Request for Proposals to Provide Cable Television
Service to the Designated Service Area 1 [hereinafter cited as Pacific Proposal].
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system would not be leased at all. Pacific planned to lease 80 of the 112
channels on the subscriber network for independent operation. Moreover,
Pacific intended to retain complete ownership of the separate Institutional
Network. That portion of the system's facilities would be operated by and
for the exclusive benefit of the telephone company. 14
6
Pacific Bell's innovative foray into the cable TV arena also extended to its
involvement in the franchise process. Rather than waiting to be asked by a
franchise applicant to supply its broadband distribution expertise, the tele-
phone company submitted its own application.147 The Palo Alto City Coun-
cil's Request for Proposals (RFP) was interpreted by Pacific Bell as an open
invitation to anyone able to provide cable service. With a rationale reminis-
cent of the pre-1970 channel service arrangements, this telco asserted that its
telephone service franchise provided it with authority to wire the city,
thereby obviating any need for a specific cable system franchise.14 In its
section 214 application, Pacific Bell proposed to construct a cable system
with the City of Palo Alto as operator.
Despite Pacific Bell's intention to have Palo Alto lease its subscriber net-
work, the city has nevertheless declined the telephone company's invitation
to operate the cable television service. Instead, the city council decided to
entertain the proposals of two franchise applicants, each of whom has sub-
mitted proposals technologically different from that of Pacific Bell for distri-
bution of their cable television service. 149 In response to an apparent lack of
interest on the city's part, Pacific Bell insists that its advanced cable distribu-
tion is an optimum arrangement for Palo Alto, particularly because of the
flexibility and control that such an advanced system would afford in re-
sponse to the specific needs of the residents.
As of yet, Pacific Bell has not been successful in convincing others of the
merit of its proposal. Based perhaps on its judicious decision not to accept
Pacific Bell's lease offer, as well as on its desire not to influence adversely the
ongoing franchise process, the City of Palo Alto refrained from providing
the pole conduit rights certification required by the Commission as part of a
146. Id.
147. The common practice is to apply for authority to construct channel facilities in re-
sponse to the need of a successful cable franchisee. In this instance, however, the telephone
company submitted its own proposal directly to the franchising body-without the participation
of an independent cable operator.
148. See discussion of telephone franchise-based authority for provision of channel service
prior to cross-ownership prohibition, supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
149. Of the five franchise applicants, the city chose to negotiate with two cable companies,
with the understanding that either of them could opt to have Pacific construct its facilities.
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successful section 214 application.15 ° Therefore, the Commission refused
Pacific Bell's request for section 214 authority in a Memorandum Opinion
and Order holding that the absence of this certification, which indicated lack
of a cable operator customer, was fatal to Pacific's application.1 5 1 Accord-
ingly, the application was dismissed without prejudice as being prematurely
filed. The decision failed to address whether the telco's retention and opera-
tion of such a large portion of the system would have been allowed. It also
did not indicate whether Pacific Bell's use of its telephone service capabilities
to qualify for the city's cable television franchise process would be consid-
ered an appropriate use of its common carrier position.
IX. THE C & P/DCI JOINT VENTURE PROPOSAL TO THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
As discussed earlier, the DCI and C & P joint venture in the District of
Columbia is one of the most recent examples of the telephone industry's
renewed interest in the provision of cable-related services. 5 2 As part of its
successful franchise application, DCI proposed that C & P construct broad-
band transport facilities to be used to distribute DCI's cable service to sub-
scribers. DCI argued that C & P's involvement would assure the
construction of a quality cable delivery system and the expeditious delivery
of cable service to the District.
A. Description of Services
On September 10, 1984, C & P Telephone Company submitted an applica-
tion to the FCC for approval under section 214 to construct and maintain
broadband transport facilities in the District for exclusive use by DCI. The
system that C & P designed would use a combination of microwave and
coaxial cable to provide two distinct service networks. In accord with DCI's
franchise, the broadband facilities would consist of seventy-nine forward and
four reverse channels on the residential network, and fifty-one forward and
twenty-seven reverse channels on the institutional network, for a total of 161
channels. In addition, an inactive "shadow cable" would also run along the
150. Memorandum dated March 14, 1984 to Cable Files, Palo Alto City Clerk's Office
regarding telephone call from Jeanne Moulton to Jerry Yanowitz.
151. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Application of Pacific Bell for Section 214
Authority, File No. W-P-C-5384.
152. Bell Atlantic, C & P's parent company, has expressed an interest in making a bid to
build a similar system in Baltimore, Maryland and may approach other cities that do not have
cable television service. Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1984, at F4, col. 6. Another Bell Atlantic sub-
sidiary, Bell of Pennsylvania, has discussed the possibility of constructing a cable system for
the city of Philadelphia. See MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 20, 1984, at 15.
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residential route to provide additional channel capacity in the future. Plans
call for the residential network to offer a three-tiered assortment of program
and nonprogram services ranging from basic broadcast signals to interactive
shopping and home banking services.
B. Indices of Ownership
One area of interest in the C & P/DCI joint venture is the ownership
structure for the project and facilities. Unlike the standard cable television
leaseback, ownership of the C & P/DCI system would not be held com-
pletely by either party. The agreement between C & P and DCI provides
that C & P should hold legal title as "record owner," while DCI, as "benefi-
cial owner," should enjoy "all other incidents of ownership."' 53 In accord
with this creative proprietary arrangement, C & P promised not to claim an
investment tax credit or a depreciation allowance for the cost of building the
systems as long as such tax benefits are claimed by DCI.' 54
Additionally, DCI would receive the exclusive right to use the system in
the provision of cable service. 5 ' On the other hand, no provision is made
for transfer of legal title by C & P to DCI at termination of the agreement.' 56
Moreover, DCI's right to transfer its interest in the system is limited to
transfers to subsequent franchisees, city-appointed trustees, or the city it-
self.'57 As a result, absent failure to obtain the necessary approval, C & P
may hold title to the facilities of the cable television system as long as it is
used to provide cable service to the District of Columbia, regardless of who
operates the system.
C. Construction Arrangements
The construction guidelines established in the C & P/DCI Agreement
may provide additional guidance on the issue of ownership and control. The
construction routes, mechanisms, and timetables are very strictly dictated.
They evidence, however, no clear governing influence other than compliance
with the franchise. The work description calls for minimal integration of the
cable system lines with C & P's own telephone conduits,' 58 but the scheme
153. Agreement for the Provision of Broadband Transport Facilities, The Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company and District Cablevision, Inc., Nov. 5, 1984, at § 11.4 [hereinafter
cited as C & P/DC1 Agreement].
154. Id. § 11.4.
155. Id. § 11.1.
156. In fact, C & P would have no obligation to relinquish its legal title to the cable system
unless it was unable to secure approval from the Commission under § 214 or from the court
under the Modified Final Judgment. C & P/DCI Agreement, supra note 153, at § 12.3(4).
157. Id. § 17.1.
158. Id. § 3.3.
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for selecting rights of way in the District shows a preference for existing
poles and conduits, particularly those of C & P.' 5 9
The agreement places full financial responsibility on DCI. A letter of
credit from DCI to C & P triggers the start of preconstruction activities" 6
by the telephone company, and every subsequent expenditure requires DCI's
authorization 61 to be followed by actual payment within thirty days. In this
manner, the arrangement ensures that C & P has accepted very little finan-
cial risk in this joint venture.
A separate agreement will cover pole attachments and conduit space nec-
essary to the construction of the DCI system. 162 This arrangement is to
follow the now standard FCC provisions for fair and reasonable rates, terms,
and conditions. Attachments to poles not controlled by C & P, however,
would be subject to preexisting joint-use agreements between C & P and the
other utility providers, with payments made directly to C & P for subsequent
transmittal to the other utilities in the District.
D. Operating Arrangements
After construction is completed, C & P proposes to remain involved in the
District of Columbia cable system through maintenance service agreements.
DCI has contracted with C & P to perform the franchise requirement of
round-the-clock maintenance service for only that portion of the cable facili-
ties which C & P has constructed. 163 C & P will bill DCI in advance on a
monthly basis for this service.
Excluding its maintenance responsibilities, C & P will otherwise have no
involvement with the operation of DCI's cable television system.' All con-
trol over initial services, inactive or reserved services, and future channel
capacity will be held by DCI. In its agreement, C & P acknowledges that
DCI may offer competition in the provision of two-way services, but that for
such activities DCI should be regulated as a common carrier.
65
E. Final Steps to Construction
The existence of the C & P/DCI joint venture was contingent upon au-
thorization from various governmental entities. Initially, the District of Co-
159. Id. §§ 5.9, 5.10.
160. Id. § 4.1.
161. Id. § 8.1.
162. Id. § 5.3.
163. Id. § 7.2.
164. Id. § 11.2.
165. Lloyd & Leahy, The New Border Wars: Confrontation Between Cable and Telco Inter-
ests, TELEMATICS, August 1984, at 6.
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lumbia Council reviewed the merits of the venture during its franchising
process. More recently, on January 30, 1985, the FCC granted C & P au-
thority to construct the facilities for DCI.166 On February 5, 1985, the
Justice Department approved the activity under the MFJ.167 The final step
toward construction of the system was DCI's consummation of the contract
with the District government on February 25, 1985.168
In signing the cable pact, DCI promised that construction on the $130-
million, 1,115-mile system will begin within eighteen months and will be
completed within four years. Under the contract, DCI must provide service
to at least 14% of the homes in each of the city's eight wards by April 1,
1986. In addition, the city will require the company to establish a two mil-
lion dollar security fund while the system is under construction. Further,
DCI must secure thirty million dollars in initial financing before April 1,
1986 or suffer termination of the franchise agreement.
X. PROS AND CONS OF CABLE TV PROPOSALS
An examination of the pros and cons of telco involvement in the construc-
tion and maintenance of cable television broadband distribution facilities in
the same city where it provides local exchange service is timely and war-
ranted. There are a number of arguments that must be evaluated prior to
reaching a conclusion regarding the legality and propriety of cable/telco
construction proposals.
The vast revenue base generated by the telephone companies' monopoly
service justifies concern over the construction of possible cross-subsidized
ventures into the openly competitive area of cable television systems. Also,
cable operators should be limited in their ability to enter into joint ventures
with local telcos in ways that may have an anticompetitive effect on the de-
livery of enhanced services to consumers. There are equities favoring cable/
telco construction projects. The cost of constructing and operating cable
systems has forced cable operators to reevaluate previously awarded
franchising agreements while seeking alternative means of financing con-
struction and operation of cable systems. Cable operators have recently be-
gun to open new points of negotiation with local governments to develop
ways to reduce the often crippling expense necessary to construct and to
operate a cable television system. Franchises previously awarded to cable
operators proposing to construct fifty-five channel systems have now been
revised downward with proposals for fewer channels. In some instances,
166. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
168. Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
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telco construction of the cable television system would reduce the cost of
underground construction and better and more efficiently utilize conduit
space in existing telecommunications facilities. Moves in this area have also
been supported by the willingness of the telephone company to assist the
cable operator in providing marketing and maintenance services.
Additionally, cooperative efforts between cable operators and telcos could
lead to more active inter-connected data networks for midtown corporate
institutional networks. Moreover, cable/telco joint ventures would reduce
the inconveniences to the public imposed by constructing an underground
system through a more expeditious use of the short-term workforce required
to build the system.
Cable operators have mounted an attack against these proposed relation-
ships between telcos and cable operators. The California Cable Television
Association (CCTA) has claimed that proposals of this type would reduce
local control and transfer to federal regulators much of the control tradition-
ally exercised by municipalities over cable franchises. Many argue that the
telephone companies, through use of their monopoly power, will create an
anticompetitive climate for cable-related businesses. Cable companies have
also argued to federal and state regulators that BOC involvement in cable
construction and leaseback ventures will cause an upward pressure on local
telephone rates resulting from the increased cost of telephone customer tar-
iffs to fund the vast capital expenditures required to finance the construction
of broadband cable facilities.
First amendment issues are also raised due to the potential for placing
control over the facilities utilized in transmitting video programming either
in the hands of local government officials through their regulation of the
telephone utility or in the telcos themselves. The ultimate fear asserted in
opposition to joint cable/telco proposals is that the cable television industry
will become anticompetitive due to the telephone company's exertion of the
power to control the means of receiving the only other form of broadband
wire transmission to the home that can perceivably provide a long-term
competitive alternative to telephone systems through various bypass
technologies.
There are valid arguments on both sides of this debate. On balance, the
public interest favors the movement by the telephone company back into the
cable television industry. The potential for the delivery of new and nearly
inconceivable technology outweighs the potential for anticompetitive
behavior.
The potential for anticompetitive behavior is sufficiently great to warrant
the FCC's imposition of structural safeguards to separate the accounting and
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operational departments of the telco's cable television construction depart-
ment from its other departments which perform common carrier functions.
These minimal regulations will not inhibit the development of aggressive and
successful joint ventures between telcos and cable operators.
XI. CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years telcos have come full circle in their efforts to
facilitate the development of cable television service. At one time, local tele-
phone companies made their facilities open to cable television operators.
Thereafter, a period of hostility emerged which was characterized by telco
schemes to thwart cable television access to poles and underground conduits.
Presently, we are experiencing a reaffirmation of the cooperative spirit be-
tween the telco and cable industries.
This cooperative spirit should be permitted to continue and mature. The
new generation of telco involvement in the construction of cable television
broadband facilities is in its infancy. There are a number of cable television
systems in many small and large markets throughout the country that have
not been built; thus the future holds numerous opportunities to forge new
relationships between cable television companies and local telcos to expedite
the construction of broadband facilities.
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